The Inquirer has not come out at all well from the controversy over Gracia Burnham’s testimony during the Dos Palmas hearings.
On Friday it confidently proclaimed “Gracia clears military” in a tabloid-style headline. Given that her book In the presence of my enemies provides extensive evidence of collusion between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Abu Sayyaf (see articles on this blog here and here) that struck me as very unlikely. And in fact when you dug into Friday’s Inquirer’s story it turned out that its only source was the government prosecutors (the hearing was in camera). The emphasis here should be on the word “government” – in other words representatives of an administration that has a very, very big stake in making sure that no one comes away with the unfortunate impression that the reason it took over a year to “rescue” Gracia (leaving her husband Martin and fellow hostage Ediborah Yap dead in a botched rescue attempt) was because the military was making a tidy profit out of selling bullets and other materiel to their Abu Sayyaf captors and hoped for a cut of any ransom payment.
By Saturday, the “Gracia clears military” story was already starting to unravel, with Senator Pimentel pointing out that:
it was unlikely that Burnham would change her account. He said what was reported in the media about her testimony before s special court at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig last Thursday might be a "spin" initiated by certain groups to eventually clear some military officials.I opened today’s Inquirer to find the paper in full throttle reverse. Oops, it turns out that video footage has now become available. It shows that Gracia didn’t clear the military at all. In fact she wasn’t even allowed to comment on the question of military collusion:
"The footage showed Burnham on the witness stand. In the background, a defense lawyer could be heard asking her if there had been collusion between military and the ASG [Abu Sayyaf group].Immediately, the government prosecutors [yes, those same guys] objected, saying the issue was irrelevant to the case.
Pahimna [the judge] was heard instructing her staff not to record Burnham’s answer.
The defense pressed on but was over-ruled by Pahimma who said the defense lawyers could “ask her (Burnham) later.”
All the while, Burnham was seen on the video seated and not uttering a word.”
The issue of collusion between the AFP and the Dos Palmas kidnappers (particularly during the Lamitan Hospital “escape”) is one of the big stories of the the first Arroyo administration. If the country’s leading investigative newspaper is just going to parrot government officials and the key witness is prohibited from giving evidence, how are we ever going to find out what happened?
I’ll leave the last word to today’s Inquirer story:
“Malacanang and Armed Forces officials expressed satisfaction over her testimony, as reported in the media. Others who later saw the ABS-CBN footage, including lawyers, were confused.”Quite.
Lamitan- The Unending Hearings Finally Ended (?)
By Romeo B. Dominguez
LtGeneral Dominguez was the Commander of the Joint Task Force Comet (JTFC) which had three (3) brigades operating in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi; and Task Force Zambo that was deployed in Zamboanga City. SOUTHCOM created JTFC effective April 3, 2001, and designated him its head in concurrent capacity as 1st Infantry Division (1ID) chief. JTFC recovered long-time hostage Jeffrey Schilling from the clutches of Abu Sayaff in mid-April. LtGen Dominguez left JTFC on Jun 22, and 1ID on July 7 and proceeded to head the Army’s 8th Inf Div deployed in Leyte and Samar, and had three Bns in Mindanao. He was promoted to MGEN in Dec ’01 and to his current rank (LtGen) on 01 Jul 2003; and designated Commander, Northern Luzon Command eff 05 Feb 2003. NOLCOM controls two Army divisions plus Naval and Air Force support units. His compulsory retirement is set on 31 Oct 2005.
A. JTF Comet
I was commander of the JTF Comet during the clash between the military and the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) on June 2, 2001, in Lamitan, one of the six towns and one city of the island province of Basilan which was within the area of responsibility of the Army’s 103rd Inf Brigade; its commander was Col Jovenal Narcise until his relief on June 6, 2001. Thereafter, the troops in Basilan nearly tripled, increasing the lone brigade to three: two Infantry and one Marine. The deployment was completed by the time I left Basilan on 22 June; subsequently I moved from 1st Inf (Tabak) Division to 8th Infantry Division on 7 July.
B. Two Hospitals in Lamitan
Key to better understanding the Lamitan incident is knowing there were two hospitals: Torres, inside the compound taken over by the Abu Sayaff; and Emergency District, a kilometer away; and which I visited on Jun 2 from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. The subsequent vicious media attacks against me were centered on this visit.
C. Scope of the Hearings
The complaint that triggered two separate legislative hearings focused on the three areas which the investigations have unraveled based on the Lamitan witnesses’ testimonies most of which merely confirmed the earlier findings of the Army Inspector General.
1. The escape of the Abu Sayaff through the back door of the church-cum-hospital compound around 5:30 p.m.
There was no order for the Army troops to withdraw; its was a judgment call by the Company Commander. A section of Rangers was moved to the front, but the remaining troops remained well positioned. The failure to stop the escape was traced to the Abu Sayaff’s use of the hostages as shield. (This is the same technique used in November of same year by the MNLF Breakaway Group in parading thru major thoroughfares of Zamboanga City, after a siege at Kabatangan, before “disappearing” without a trace in the forested northern borders of the city). The soldiers, police and civilian volunteers fired to miss; they could not risk to hurt the hostages. But it was not a “walk-in-the-park” for the terrorists: Mrs Recio was wounded and the ASG was forced to leave the couple behind. (Mr Recio testified later that months later he negotiated directly for the release of a relative still with the ASG and gave the money thru a courier; all these w/o the knowledge of the AFP).
2. The alleged payoff involving the military to free a rich hostage
There was no payoff involving the military. The assertion of the lone “witness” was disproved as follows:
a. She alleged that on my arrival at the Emergency District Hospital, a black briefcase full of money was being carried by my aide who stayed outside the head doctor’s office where I stayed after a tentative look-see of my casualties. If indeed there was a briefcase and it contained lots of money, would I have not kept my aide within my sight all the time? Would I have allowed him to take P5,000 from it to be given to the doctor?
b. The time (11 a.m.) that the witness said I left the hospital (I actually left past 12 noon) to fetch the recovered hostages (and returned without the money) was long after the hostages had been rescued by the troops (before 10 a.m.)
c. The latest assertion was that the money (non-existent, in fact) was a payoff for the escape of the Abu Sayaff. If that was the case, then it would be unthinkable for the money to be carried around so casually, let alone shown for everyone to see. Then there was the matter of the amount: initially pegged at P2M it was raised to P25M which would be impossible to fit inside an attaché case, much more to be carried by one person.
d. She claimed that Col Narcise was waiting for me when I arrived; in fact, it was I who waited for him. Note how the supposed witness erred in describing the events; my own actions were liberally interpreted and given slant to support the main allegation.
e. The witness’ motive was, however, not established as she was not cross-examined.
3. The decision not to redeploy the 18th IBn elements from Tuburan to Lamitan.
The decision was reached following a heated discussion at HQ 103rd Bde involving me, CSAFP Gen Villanueva, SOUTHCOM LTGen Camiling and his AC3 (Operation Officer), Col Pabustan in weighing the following fresh inputs: the continuing engagement in Tuburan and intel report of an approaching Abu Sayaff reinforcement towards Tuburan; plus the tipped-off arrival of CTF and a Marine Company and the presence of 100 plus soldiers, 40 policemen, armor vehicles and helicopters in Lamitan.
CO, 18IB admitted he received the order directly from CSAFP Gen Villanueva thru radio. I relayed the same order personally to Col Narcise when I met him in Lamitan. Note that while CSAFP “bypassed” SOUTHCOM, JTFC and 103rd Bde in giving the order to the Bn Comdr, I didn’t bypass anyone as there is no intervening hqs between my JTFC and Narcise’s Bde. It was at this time that I formulated my order to “assault before sundown” after I had received information that the Abu Sayaff at the “hospital-church compound” would attempt to escape at sundown to take advantage of the darkness.
D. Soldiers’ Accomplishments Downplayed
Looking back, the said Lamitan clash showcased the commitment of our soldiers to the service. Within 24 hours, they rescued 21 of 30 (70 percent) Dos Palmas hostages. Unfortunately, the bandits got away using the remaining victims as shield. The media slant on this aspect, the sensationalized and biased reporting, blurred the line between fact and fiction.
Including the brief period to prepare the battle areas and the actual clash of a little over 24 hours, the incident lasted about 2 days. 103rd Inf Bde had barely 2,000 troops – only about half of whom could be maneuvered as others were doing rear-area activities and protection, camp and route security, CAA supervision, etc.
As it was a non-conventional situation, these front-lines troops had to be distributed to several battle areas or pre-selected sites of possible enemy congregations. (Hence, only a hundred could be rushed to Lamitan that day.) Civilian residents limited the potentials of indirect fires.
The commander’s picture of his battle site is limited only to what his eyes can see. We had no satellite, radars or sensors to aid us.
E. US Forces Operation: The Great Contrast
Contrast all this with the months of mobilization the high tech US Forces had to take following the September 11 attacks. Then, came the daily 24-hour bombing of Afghanistan that took months. Specific targets were shown on video screens moments before they got blasted away. The enemy was defeated; but Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leader Omar are unaccounted for until now and Al-Qaeda remains a threat.
Yet, there are no accusations of a pay-off to the US forces; no congressional hearings in aid of legislation. US Congress simply appropriated for the war chest against International Terrorism. (The world would witness the same pattern of preparation/mobilization as the Coalition Forces took on Iraq early 2003; eventual reports of Saddam’s death are said to be exaggerated!)
F. An Injustice Persists
We understand the long suffering of the residents in the eight or nine years of the Abu Sayaff’s depredation. But rumors about the alleged duplicity of government forces fighting the bandits are insulting, malicious and unfair.
Small lapses of the commanders at the lowest level were magnified and linked to imagined collusion to feed the discontent of an exasperated public. Yet, we in the military would have wanted nothing better than to end the people’s grief by destroying the Abu Sayaff kidnappers holed up in that compound in Lamitan.
The dynamics of war as it impacted on soldiers steeped on laws, regulations, SOPs and respect for human lives, however, are a bit difficult to understand when the dust of battle and gun smoke have settled down and the smell of gun powder and unwashed human bodies, living, dying or dead, no longer permeates the air.
Your soldiers make mistakes, but under no circumstances will they accept blood money. The monster was a creation of the media that failed to validate their source of information.
They then pressed on to condition the minds of people based on innuendos, while the accuser mobilized witnesses who were wiling to sign fabricated testimonies, and who seemed unfamiliar
with laws on perjury and therefore unaware of the consequences.
G. “Lapses” Not Traced To Me
I believe I had given my best to provide command & leadership to the five Infantry Brigades under my authority at 1ID/JTF Comet.
I have suffered the ignominy of perceived failure due to breakdown of chain-of-command in one of these brigades: the 103rd Inf Bde in Basilan, where I spent sometime going to the front to see the situation on the ground and show myself to the troops at the real risks of being subjected to enemy fire.
My action have been misinterpreted and portrayed in the worst possible light & presented to the public in an extended trial by publicity that was applauded by fence-sitters who only have hatred for the soldiers. All that in a way contradictory to the most cherished legal tenet: “The accused is considered innocent until proven otherwise”. This, after an extensive investigation by the Army Inspector General, the result of which proved I was not liable; I was allowed to head another command, got promoted and subsequently took over a Unified Command in control of two Infantry Divisions. I received my third star on July 1 2003.
I have sought to understand the difficult experience of my accuser; but the motive of this stranger is something beyond my rational mind. He claims to have a long list of civilian witnesses; two of those he presented, both CVO’s and whose presence in the area was confirmed by the Rangers, admitted during the hearings that the area of conflict was totally deserted by residents.
H. Needed: A Thorough Investigation
My wish all through out the investigation had been for the effort to extend to the moments the Abu Sayaff bandits decided to go to lamitan, and why they targeted the compound, of all places.
Only then can answers be found to such other questions as: how the accuser’s bodyguard-soldier was killed and how the complainant could be so sure of actions that transpired in distant places and simultaneously be unable to recall those that happenened under his very nose. It struck me as strange that both panels didn’t do a cross-check; just as I found it improper that accusations were heard in Executive Sessions in which the accused were not allowed to attend. The woman who was too specific about his observations turned out to have difficulty seeing due to diabetes. She was certain, for example, about the “briefcase” being carried by my aide; but she could not identify the very same officer who was seated beside her during the final hearing.
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines spokesman Msgr Quitorio told me that Fr Cirilo Nacorda had admitted to him that the Lamitan priests never had any evidence, only “witnesses”. As observed by two senior legislators, the 21 witnesses Fr Nacorda herded during the investigation bore affidavits uniformly written in English; although most of them spoke a mix of Tagalog and their dialect. And when the two CVO’s were allowed to talk freely, they basically repudiated their written testimonies.
I. Status of reports
After almost 2 years, the separate reports of the two Houses have yet to reach their respective chambers plenary Sessions. Interestingly, when the Senate’s draft report “leaked” out; the media’s focus was on the tentative conclusion that there was indeed an AFP-ASG collusion, ignoring the fact that 8 of 12 members disagreed.. In contrast, media almost ignored the House report in which its 92 members unanimously concluded there was NO AFP-ASG conclusion. If the votes of both panels were lumped together, one hundred out of the combined total of 104 agreed there was no collusion! And finally, in their extensive discussions on so-called “operational lapses”, both panel particularized the “players” on the two major non-events: CSAFP’s direct order to 18IBn to continue its contact with the enemy in Tuburan (which is sound, per se); and Cpt Guinolbay’s irrational order to shift his Rangers. Just the same, it is I who is being made responsible for the two actions!
J. Conclusion
Two recent books seem to clarify certain points.
Ms Burnham’s book controverted the claim of “walk-in-the-park” exit of the ASG at the back of the hospital. This slant stoked the collusion angle. Gracia said the firefight intensified during the escape, where hostage Recio was wounded and prompted the ASG to leave him and his wife behind. Her account of ransom negotiation was set sometime in 2002; long after I left JTF Comet.
In his book, ex-Senator Tatad mentioned of non-respect of Senate procedures by some of its members. In the Lamitan case, a Senator was often quoted attributing his minority position as the panel’s findings; and claims that his panel’s report is done although the Senate plenary has yet to table it for discussion. In another instance, another Senator would talk of the bravery of the witnesses while ignoring that all testimonies were found either unsubstantiated or pure fiction. Indeed politicians’ perception of truth and sense of justice could be overwhelmed by political ambition. They are two of the four members of the Senate panel whose position was opposed by the panel’s majority.
The continuing turbulence in the media following the publication of Ms Burnham’s book prompted Defense Secretary Reyes to direct GHQ for the Inspector General (TIG) Rear Admiral Israel, to initiate a pre-trial investigation. Apparently, the defense establishment could not anymore wait for either House of Congress to endorse its respective findings while the media feasted on the “collusion angle”, based on the position of the four (4) senators who represented less than 4% of the combined total of the two hearing bodies.
TIG’s report was forthright, brief and precise:
· “No evidence to show collusion or connivance between members of the AFP and the ASG;”
· “No evidence to show that some officers in the AFP took part in the negotiation nor in the actual payment of ransom money to the ASG to ensure the release of the Hostages nor some officers benefited from such ransom payments;”
· “These are strong indications of operational lapses. Tactical lapses were obvious at the BRIGADE level, where nothing was done to have an effective command & control of the troops engaging the enemy during the Lamitan Siege;”
· “Col Jovenal Narcise, erstwhile 103rd Brigade Commander, be held responsible for such “lapses”… (his) case be referred to the Efficiency and Separation Board…”
In concurring, CSAFP Gen Narciso Abaya secured the legal opinion of the Judge Advocate General, Col Sarmiento, and endorsed the entire folder to SND for the latter’s information. This effectively closed this chapter in my career.
I have to move on.
Lamitan case has to move on.
But the church has an unfinished task. The many discussions revealed the martyrdom of another priest, Fr Gallardo of Zambles, who was kidnapped by the bandits in 2000 or a year before the Lamitan incident. Words had it that his loyalty to the Faith was challenged eleven (11) times. For each affirmation a finger nail was removed; on the eleventh ‘NO”, the priest was beheaded. As a Catholic, I feel we have in Fr Gallardo another saint. As a Filipino, I see him as an authentic hero. RBD
Posted by: NOLCOM, AFP | August 03, 2004 at 12:25 AM